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European data protection law has become (in-)famously known as one of the main
tools for both the European legislature and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to
push the boundaries of European integration. The most recent decision of the Court
in Case C-645/19, 15 June 2021 – Facebook Ireland continues this well-established
tradition. By contrast to other ground-breaking judgments such as Digital Rights
Ireland, Google Spain or Schrems I and II, its revolutionary aspects do however not
catch the eye, but lie in the consequences of what may at first glance appear as a
rather technical ruling. Thus, the following analysis will not limit itself to the direct
consequences of the judgement, but shed some light on its revolutionary implications
for the conflict of Member States’ GDPR adaptation laws. Under the complex system
of international competence set up by the GDPR, national data protection authorities
(DPAs) may find themselves obliged to enforce foreign (public) law domestically – an
unprecedented step for the ever-closer integration of the EU’s legal order.
The ECJ’s Judgment in Case C-645/19 – Facebook
Ireland
Backdrop to the decision is another dispute about the processing of personal data
by Facebook, established on EU territory with two entities relevant to the case, one
in Ireland – where art. 4(16)(a) GDPR considers Facebook’s “main establishment” –
and one in Belgium. Unlike the former, assuming full responsibility for all processing
operations concerning European users (para. 86), the latter primarily allows the
group to engage with EU institutions and secondarily promotes advertising and
marketing in Belgium (paras. 92 et seq.). Both entities had initially been sued under
the GDPR’s predecessor, the Data Protection Directive, by what under the GDPR
has become the Belgian DPA in front of Belgian courts for infringing substantive
(Belgian) data protection law. With the entry into force of the GDPR, the defendants
claimed that the Belgian DPA had lost its competence to bring the action, relying on
the so-called “one-stop-shop” mechanism set up under art. 56, 60 GDPR. According
to Facebook, only the lead supervisory authority at its main establishment, i.e.
the Irish Data Protection Commission, was entitled to enforce the GDPR against
it, including by initiating court proceedings under art. 58(5) GDPR. The referring
Brussels Court of Appeal therefore essentially inquired whether the GDPR actually
prevented other national DPAs from pursuing court proceedings for GDPR violations
arising from cross-border processing operations (for further information on the facts
of the case see here).
Based on a thorough analysis of the GDPR’s competence regime (art. 55 et seq
GDPR, paras. 47 et seq.) and its compatibility with art. 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights (paras. 66 et seq.), the ECJ holds that Member States’
supervisory authorities merely “concerned” by a certain processing operation
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(art. 4(22) GDPR) may indeed take their own enforcement action after mutual
assistance of the lead supervisory authority has been sought unsuccessfully, i.e.
because the latter does not provide the requested information in due time (para.
71). In such a situation, the concerned DPA may immediately adopt a provisional
measure for the territory of its own Member State under art. 61(8), 66(1) GDPR
(cf. this recent preliminary order by the DPA of Hamburg). However, to adopt final
measures such as the initiation of court proceedings under art. 58(5) GDPR, it is
bound by art. 66(2) GDPR to first request an affirmative urgent opinion or binding
decision from the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). In less urgent cases of
insufficient cooperation, the necessary approval by the EDPB can however only be
requested under the additional conditions of art. 64(2) GDPR, i.e. that the matter is
of general application or produces effects in more than one Member State. Once
again,1)Cf. Case C-210/16, 5 June 2018 – Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein,
paras. 50 et seq. the Court eventually refuses to further address the remaining risk of
conflicting decisions on the same processing operation arising from different national
DPAs acting under such parallel (urgency) competence (paras. 114 et seq.).
Overall, the ECJ’s decision breathes real life into the complex structure of
international cooperation between European data protection authorities set up by
the GDPR. First and foremost, the ECJ, in line with AG Bobek (paras. 53 et seq.),
emphasises the primacy of the one-stop-shop mechanism established by art. 56,
60 GDPR (paras. 50 et seq., 65). Simultaneously, the Court significantly increases
the pressure on lead supervisory authorities popular among corporate controllers to
neither delay (joint) enforcement action nor to settle too early or for too little (paras.
71, 74). In doing so, the ECJ joins a long list of opponents to the current enforcement
practice of certain one-stop-shops, including the Irish and the Luxemburgish DPA
(see, amongst others, the European Parliament, the German Federal Commissioner
for Data Protection Ulrich Kelber and noyb). Notably, the Court does not stop at
highlighting the one-stop-shop mechanism’s reliance on “effective” cooperation
between the lead and other supervisory authorities concerned, but additionally
demands “sincere” cooperation (paras. 53, 60, 63, 72), thereby going beyond
the pure letter of the GDPR (see here, as well as art. 4(3) TEU). However, as
the primacy of the one-stop-shop is also strengthened by the emphasis on the
procedural hurdles other DPAs are confronted with when considering to take action,
the judgment can indeed be described as striking a fair balance with regard to the
much disputed international competence of DPAs (cf. here, here and here).
The Hidden Revolution
The much less discussed but much more decisive question for European
integration is however left unexamined by the ECJ: If a supervisory authority merely
“concerned” in the sense of art. 4(22) GDPR – such as the Belgian DPA in the
case at hand – becomes (exceptionally) competent to assess a given processing
operation under art. 56(2), 66 GDPR, according to which law is this assessment
to be conducted? Only at first sight can this question be answered by turning to
art. 288(2) TFEU, according to which the GDPR’s harmonising provisions are
uniformly and directly applicable to any processing within its (external) scope of
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application. At a second glance, however, it becomes apparent that the GDPR forms
a so-called “limping” regulation. Despite the restrictive interpretation advisable in this
regard, Member States frequently enjoy a broad regulatory leeway (see, for instance,
art. 6(3), art. 8(1), art. 9(4), art. 23(1), art. 85 GDPR). Thus, for the vast majority of
processing operations – including those at stake in case C-645/19 – the (internal or
intra-European) conflict of laws question arises as to which supplementary national
adaptation law to apply.
1. Convergence between Competence and Applicable Law?
An obvious answer would be for each competent DPA to apply the adaptation law of
its respective Member State. In the situation at hand in Case C-645/19, however, this
would have meant that the applicable national adaptation law would have changed
with the rejection of competence by the Irish authority, making the Belgian DPA
competent and thus Belgian adaptation law applicable. This solution would leave
it in the hands of the respective one-stop-shop to either subject certain processing
operations to their own or to foreign adaptation law by assuming or rejecting the
lead under art. 56(3) GDPR. Such a situation would already be incompatible with the
principle of legal certainty, requiring both the data subject and the controller be able
to determine which rights and obligations they are subject to prior to a processing
operation. The urgency competences under art. 66 GDPR would lead to a further
multiplication of (potentially) applicable adaptation laws, only (and suddenly)
becoming decisive whenever a DPA deemed itself competent to act. Lastly, on top
of the forum shopping rightly undesired by the Court (para. 68), this approach would
in principle allow the controllers to statute shop the applicable national adaptation
law, potentially leading to a race to the bottom with devastating consequences for
the overall protective level of national adaptation law.
2. National Conflict Rules?
To fill the looming gap, several – but not all (cf. Irish Data Protection Act 2018;
Romanian Lege nr.190 din 18 iulie 2018) – Member States have adopted
autonomous conflict rules, providing for their national adaptation laws to be
applicable under very different circumstances (cf. art. 4 Belgian Loi du 30.7.2018;
art. 3 French Loi n° 78-17; § 1(4) German BDSG; Art. 1 S. 1 Polish Ustawa z dnia 10
maja 2018; to name just a few). If valid, such divergent national rules would however
lead to several accumulations as well as to lacks of applicable national adaptation
laws, equally incompatible with the GDPR’s twofold main objective of effectively
protecting fundamental rights (art. 1(1), (2) GDPR) while ensuring free movement of
personal data within the internal market (art. 1(1), (3) GDPR). By enacting several
provisions such as art. 6(3)(b) GDPR, providing for an application of the “law to
which the controller is subject”, and art. 61(4)(b) GDPR, declaring applicable the “law
to which the supervisory authority […] is subject”, the EU legislature has however
exercised its (shared) competence under art. 16(2)(1) TFEU to adopt internal conflict
of laws rules within the scope of the GDPR. Despite their high degree of abstraction,
intra-EU conflict of (adaptation) laws is therefore a Union-regulated element barred
for the Member States according to art. 2(2) TFEU. Thus, insofar as they concern
the application of national adaptation laws, the conflict rules nevertheless adopted by
the Member States are inapplicable and must be repealed.
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3. Applying Private International Law?
No further concretisation of the GDPR’s abstract internal conflict results either from
direct or indirect recourse to the rules of European Private International Law (PIL)
– mainly Regulations Rome I and II. This is because, first, due to diverging aims
and fundamental methodological discrepancies no lex specialis relationship can
be established between these private and the public conflict of law rules required
to determine the applicable national adaptation law under the GDPR, traditionally
unilateral and more abstract in scope. Second, these discrepancies also impede
recourse to single PIL provisions to solve the internal conflicts of public (adaptation)
laws arising under the GDPR by way of systematic interpretation. Third, only a very
limited gain in concretisation would follow from such an exercise anyway.
4. The Application of art. 3 GDPR by Analogy
As explained in more detail here, the only viable solution to this dilemma consists in
a Union-wide uniform definition of exactly one applicable national adaptation law per
processing operation. This alone ensures that substantive (adaptation) law does not
change with the competent authority and that legal certainty as well as the GDPR’s
main objectives are not undermined by an accumulation or lack of applicable laws.
Although the GDPR – by contrast to its predecessor (cf. art. 4(1) DPD) – does not
provide for a rule explicitly addressing such internal conflicts, it does regularly point
at the application of the “law to which the controller is subject” (i.e. at art. 6(3)(b), art.
14(5)(c), art. 17(1)(e), (3)(b), art. 22(2)(b) GDPR etc.). Still vague in itself, this intra-
EU conflicts rule must be fleshed out by applying the external conflict provisions of
art. 3 GDPR by analogy, based on the traditional principle of qualified establishment
(art. 3(1), (3) GDPR) as well as the newly introduced targeting approach (art. 3(2)
GDPR). Although these only concern the territorial scope of application of the
GDPR, their underlying concepts are equally suitable to address internal conflicts.
Consequently, the national adaptation law applicable to a processing operation
falling within the GDPR’s territorial scope according to art. 3(1) or (3) GDPR is the
one of the Member State in which the controller is qualifiedly established, whereas
operations within the scope of application of art. 3(2) GDPR are governed by the
adaptation law of the Member State(s) targeted by the controller.
The ECJ’s openness to this solution is reflected by the fact that it surprisingly
invokes art. 3 GDPR to allow the supervisory authority concerned to “exercise
[…] the power conferred […] in Article 58(5) [GDPR]” (para. 90). As the territorial
applicability of the GDPR under art. 3(1) GDPR is indisputably triggered by the
Irish main establishment anyhow, establishing this additional prerequisite for an
enforcement action of the Belgian DPA shows that the ECJ (rightly) strives to ensure
a sufficiently close connection between the processing operation at stake and the
DPA in charge. That said, the Court immediately renders its legitimate concern
absurd by applying its usual extensive interpretation of art. 3(1) GDPR (paras.
91-95), thereby virtually abandoning any limiting effect of the newly introduced
condition. Instead, a more restrictive interpretation of art. 3(1) GDPR departing from
the ECJ’s case law2)Case C-210/16, 5 June 2018 – Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-
Holstein, para. 56, Case C-230/14, 1 October 2015 – Weltimmo, para. 25, Case
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C-131/12, 13 May 2014 – Google Spain, para. 53. would be called for, not least
to limit the GDPR’s (extra#)territorial scope of application (cf., amongst others,
here, here and here). What is more, even the most legitimate concern cannot hide
the fact that neither art. 58(5) GDPR nor art. 55(1), 56, 60 GDPR require the local
establishment in the Member State of the competent authority to trigger art. 3(1)
GDPR by itself. Thus, the missing territorial link should not have been sought in (the
restriction of) the supervisory authority’s competence, but rather in identifying the
applicable national adaptation law.
Consequences
Even if a merely “concerned” supervisory authority (art. 4(22) GDPR) is exceptionally
vested with competence under art. 56(2), 66 GDPR for a specific processing
operation under the conditions outlined by the ECJ, the applicable adaptation law is
to be determined separately, applying art. 3 GDPR by analogy as outlined above. In
consequence, within the regulatory leeway left by the GDPR – which, as mentioned,
is considerable – the DPA thus competent may have to enforce foreign substantive
adaptation law. Since this primarily concerns provisions of public law balancing
the relationship between the fundamental right to data protection and conflicting
fundamental rights such as the freedoms of expression, information and press (Art.
85 GDPR), this represents an unprecedented step for European integration (which
was, however, already anticipated by AG Cruz Villalón)3)Opinion in Case C-230/14,
25 June 2015 – Weltimmo, para. 50.. Unlike traditional (European) PIL, which
governs the application of foreign private law mostly by civil courts, in this case the
conflicts rules primarily address the DPAs required to enforce foreign public (data
protection) law (as well as, secondarily, the courts overseeing them), and in doing
so having to consider the influence of foreign fundamental rights. This is perfectly
illustrated by the case at hand: if the Belgian DPA were competent to examine
certain processing operations on the exceptional grounds specified by the ECJ, it
would have to do so by enforcing Irish adaptation law applicable to these operations
according to art. 6(3)(b) GDPR et al. read in conjunction with art. 3(1) GDPR, applied
by analogy.
The application of foreign substantive law is however without prejudice to the
procedural law governing the administrative procedure initiated by the competent
DPA. By contrast to the former, the latter does indeed follow the provisions on the
competence of the national supervisory authorities (art. 55 GDRP et seq.), in full
compliance with the principle of Member States’ procedural autonomy rooted in
art. 291(1) TFEU. When enforcing the applicable (foreign) substantive adaptation
law, competent DPAs thus continue to adhere to their national procedural rules (cf.
art. 61(4)(b): “Member State law to which the supervisory authority […] is subject”,
as well as art. 58(1)(f), (4), art. 62(3), recital 143 s. 7 GDPR). What emerges is a
schism between applicable substantial and procedural law, already familiar from PIL
(forum regit processum or lex fori principle). This entails the need to qualify a specific
national provision as procedural or substantive, a task that cannot be accomplished




By not addressing which national adaptation law is to be applied to a certain
processing operation and, thus, enforced by the competent DPA, the ECJ in its most
recent decision ignores the key element for a coherent and consistent application
of data protection law under the GDPR. This is especially regrettable given that
the Court appears particularly concerned to ensure a sufficient intra-European
connection between the processing operation at stake and the data protection
authority (subsidiarily) competent for its supervision.
However, the hidden revolution triggered by the special legal structure of the
“limping” GDPR with both its broad regulatory leeway and complex system of
international competence does not fail to materialise: for the first time in the history of
the EU, Member State (data protection) authorities, as well as the courts overseeing
their activities are required to systematically enforce foreign public law domestically.
It remains to be seen whether this will set a new precedent for the ever-closer
integration of the EU or lead to a greater willingness of the Member States to abolish
the GDPR’s regulatory leeway, thereby further harmonising data protection law at
EU level.
The key arguments of this post build upon the author’s doctoral thesis, which is
about to be published in German.
The author wishes to sincerely thank Maxim Bönnemann, Filippo Mattioli and
Andrew Wright for their very valuable comments on an earlier draft of this post.
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